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1“...A typology of electoral environments in which strategic manipulation of voting rules can occur is proposed. From this typology, six different concepts of...”
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2by Favardin, Pierre Lepelley, Dominique Serais, Jérôme Published in Review of economic design (01.09.2002)“...The voting situations at which the Borda rule or the Copeland method can be manipulated by a single voter or a coalition of voters in three-alternative...”
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4by Pierre Favardin Published in Revue économique (01.03.1996)“...La compétition entre collectivités locales est légitimée par l'existence d'une base fiscale mobile dans l'économie (prenant généralement la forme d'un stock de...”
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5by Favardin, Pierre Published in Revue économique (1996)“...[eng] Competition between jurisdictions occurs when there exists a mobile tax base in the economy (most of the time a fixed amount of capital) and has recently...”
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8by Béhue, Virginie Favardin, Pierre Lepelley, Dominique Published in Recherches économiques de Louvain (2009)“...Theoretical analysis of the voting rules susceptibility to strategic manipulation suggests that the choice of the best rule (the less vulnerable to...”
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9by Béhue, Virginie Favardin, Pierre Lepelley, Dominique Published in Recherches économiques de Louvain (01.01.2010)“...Theoretical analysis of the voting rules susceptibility to strategic manipulation suggests that the choice of the best rule (the less vulnerable to...”
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11by Béhue, Virginie Favardin, Pierre Lepelley, Dominique Published in Recherches économiques de Louvain (2009)“...RésuméL’analyse théorique de la vulnérabilité des règles de vote aux comportements stratégi-ques montre que le caractère plus ou moins manipulable d’une règle...”
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12by Virginie Béhue Pierre Favardin Dominique Lepelley Published in Recherches économiques de Louvain (01.01.2009)“...L'analyse théorique de la vulnérabilité des règles de vote aux comportements stratégi-ques montre que le caractère plus ou moins manipulable d'une règle dépend...”
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13by Favardin, Pierre Lepelley, Dominique Serais, Jérôme Published in Review of Economic Design (09.10.2002)“...The voting situations at which the Borda rule or the Copeland method can be manipulated by a single voter or a coalition of voters in three-alternative...”
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16“...L’analyse théorique de la vulnérabilité des règles de vote aux comportements stratégiques montre que le caractère plus ou moins manipulable d’une règle dépend...”
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17“...International audience...”