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1by Kurz, Sascha Moyouwou, Issofa Touyem, Hilaire Published in Social choice and welfare (01.04.2021)“...The Shapley--Shubik index is a specialization of the Shapley value and is widely applied to evaluate the power distribution in committees drawing binary...”
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2“...Voting rule performances are sometimes evaluated according to their respective resistances to allow profitable misrepresentation of individual preferences...”
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3by Lepelley, Dominique Lepelley, Dominique Moyouwou, Issofa Moyouwou, Issofa Smaoui, Hatem Smaoui, Hatem Published in Social choice and welfare (01.01.2018)“...Scoring elimination rules (SER), that give points to candidates according to their rank in voters’ preference orders and eliminate the candidate(s) with the...”
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4by Gehrlein, William V Gehrlein, William V Lepelley, Dominique Lepelley, Dominique Moyouwou, Issofa Moyouwou, Issofa Published in Quality & quantity (01.11.2015)“...Gehrlein et al. (Math Soc Sci 66:352–365, 2013) have shown that an increase of the voters’ preference diversity, as measured by the number $$k$$ k of...”
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5by Andjiga, Nicolas Gabriel Andjiga, Nicolas Gabriel Moyouwou, Issofa Moyouwou, Issofa Ouambo, Monge Kleber Kamdem Ouambo, Monge Kleber Kamdem Published in Group decision and negotiation (01.05.2017)“...Applying majority voting on a set of proposals may result in a series of decisions for which there exists a majority of voters who disagree with the collective...”
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7by Sébastien Courtin Boniface Mbih Issofa Moyouwou Published in Social choice and welfare (01.04.2014)“...A Condorcet social choice procedure elects the candidate that beats every other candidate under simple majority when such a candidate exists. The reinforcement...”
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8by Béal, Sylvain Moyouwou, Issofa Rémila, Eric Solal, Philippe Published in Mathematical social sciences (01.03.2020)“...A situation in which a finite set of agents can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or...”
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9by Mbih, Boniface Mbih, Boniface Moyouwou, Issofa Moyouwou, Issofa Published in Group decision and negotiation (01.07.2008)“...Under the impartial anonymous culture assumption (IAC), we evaluate the proportion of anonymous profiles at which the amendment and plurality voting procedures...”
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10“...It usually happens that the alternatives to be voted on in committees are chosen or sponsored by some particularly active committee members. For example, in...”
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11“...The description and the characterization of the (Aumann-Maschler) bargaining set are known, but its determination is still hard given a generic transferable...”
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12“...Intuitively, a voting rule satisfies the condition of positive association if it guarantees that an improvement for an alternative in the preferences expressed...”
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13“...It has been known for a long time that many binary voting rules can select a Pareto dominated outcome, that is an outcome such that there exists some other...”
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14by Sébastien Courtin Boniface Mbih Issofa Moyouwou Thomas Senné Published in Social choice and welfare (01.09.2010)“...The reinforcement axiom roughly states that when an alternative is selected by two different constituencies, it must also be selected by their union. Hare and...”
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15by Andjiga, Nicolas Gabriel Mbih, Boniface Moyouwou, Issofa Published in Journal of mathematical economics (2008)“...In this paper we define manipulation with restricted beliefs as the possibility for some voter to have an insincere preference ordering that dominates the...”
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16by Nicolas Gabriel Andjiga Issofa Moyouwou Issofa Mouyouwou Joël Moulen Published in Annals of economics and statistics (01.01.2011)“...The Arrow theorem states that a social welfare function (SWF) that simultaneously satisfies completeness, transitivity, independence of irrelevant alternatives...”
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18by Gehrlein, William V Lepelley, Dominique Moyouwou, Issofa Published in Mathematical social sciences (01.03.2016)“...Analytical representations are developed for the probability that Approval Voting (AV) elects the Condorcet Loser in three-alternative elections with large...”
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19by Martin, Mathieu Courtin, Sebastien Moyouwou, Issofa Published in Theory and decision (31.12.2015)
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20by Courtin, Sébastien Courtin, Sébastien Martin, Mathieu Martin, Mathieu Moyouwou, Issofa Moyouwou, Issofa Published in Theory and decision (01.07.2015)“...According to a given quota $$q$$ q , a candidate $$a$$ a is beaten by another candidate $$b$$ b if at least a proportion of $$q$$ q individuals prefer $$b$$ b...”