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1“...This paper studies the relationship between international conflict and the size distribution of countries in a model in which both peaceful bargaining and...”
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2“...In a study of public good and solidarity experiments conducted in eastern and western Germany, we found in both games that eastern subjects behave in a...”
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3by Hoel, Michael Published in Journal of public economics (1997)“...In order to reach a Pareto optimal outcome with transboundary environmental problems, there must be some kind of international environmental agreement. One...”
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4“...A group of countries that can potentially commit to cooperation to protect the environment are identified as environmentally conscious countries. Conditions...”
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5by DIAMANTOUDI, EFFROSYNI SARTZETAKIS, EFTICHIOS S Published in Journal of public economic theory (01.05.2006)“... ) Strategies for the international protection of the environment , Journal of Public Economics 52 , 309 – 328 . CHANDER , P. , and H. TULKENS ( 1995 ) A core‐theoretic...”
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6by SHAH, SUDHIR A Published in Journal of public economic theory (01.06.2010)“...We study a remedy for the problem caused by international transfrontier pollution. Our results are derived from the analysis of a noncooperative game model of...”
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7by GRAZIOSI, GRÉGOIRE ROTA Published in Journal of public economic theory (01.04.2009)“...We consider as endogenous the choice of the delegation rule in an international agreement between two countries. We study three potential types of delegation:...”
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8by Ponsatí, Clara Published in Journal of public economic theory (01.12.2004)“...We study bilateral conflicts that affect the welfare of third parties, the stakeholders. The conflict takes the form of a war of attrition and intervention is...”
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9“...Most noncooperative game theoretic models of international environmental agreements (IEAs) draw a pessimistic picture of the prospective of successful...”