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1“...We compare in this paper two classes of sequential scoring rules: the first class eliminates at each step the candidate with the lowest score whereas the...”
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2“...This monograph studies voting procedures based on the probability that paradoxical outcomes like the famous Condorcet Paradox might exist...”
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4by Barthelemy, Fabrice Lepelley, Dominique Martin, Mathieu Smaoui, Hatem Published in Group decision and negotiation (01.02.2021)“...In a weighted voting game, each voter has a weight and a proposal is accepted if the sum of the weights of the voters in favor of that proposal is at least as...”
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5by Gehrlein, William V Gehrlein, William V Lepelley, Dominique Lepelley, Dominique Published in Quality & quantity (01.07.2016)“...The Condorcet efficiencies of plurality rule (PR), negative plurality rule (NPR), Borda rule (BR), plurality elimination rule (PER) and negative plurality...”
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7by Gehrlein, William V Gehrlein, William V Lepelley, Dominique Lepelley, Dominique Published in Group decision and negotiation (01.03.2015)“...Approval Voting is known to possess many good properties when voters have dichotomous preferences. But, when attention was restricted to the limiting case for...”
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8by de Mouzon, Olivier Laurent, Thibault Le Breton, Michel Lepelley, Dominique Published in Social choice and welfare (01.03.2020)“...In this article, we evaluate asymptotically the probability ϕ(n) of an election inversion in a toy symmetric version of the US presidential electoral system...”
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9by Lepelley, Dominique Lepelley, Dominique Moyouwou, Issofa Moyouwou, Issofa Smaoui, Hatem Smaoui, Hatem Published in Social choice and welfare (01.01.2018)“...Scoring elimination rules (SER), that give points to candidates according to their rank in voters’ preference orders and eliminate the candidate(s) with the...”
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10by de Mouzon, Olivier de Mouzon, Olivier Laurent, Thibault Laurent, Thibault Le Breton, Michel Le Breton, Michel Lepelley, Dominique Lepelley, Dominique Published in Public choice (01.04.2019)“...The main purpose of this paper is to explore the consequences of the formation of either a Regional Popular Vote Interstate compact or a National Popular Vote...”
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11by Gehrlein, William V Gehrlein, William V Lepelley, Dominique Lepelley, Dominique Moyouwou, Issofa Moyouwou, Issofa Published in Quality & quantity (01.11.2015)“...Gehrlein et al. (Math Soc Sci 66:352–365, 2013) have shown that an increase of the voters’ preference diversity, as measured by the number $$k$$ k of...”
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12by Gehrlein, William V Lepelley, Dominique Plassmann, Florenz Published in Group decision and negotiation (01.09.2016)“...We compare the Condorcet Efficiencies of the plurality rule, the negative plurality rule, and the Borda rule to examine what might be gained by using a voting...”
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13by Le Breton, Michel Lepelley, Dominique Smaoui, Hatem Published in Journal of mathematical economics (01.05.2016)“...The main purpose of this paper is to estimate the probability of casting a decisive vote under the majority rule for a class of random electorate models...”
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14by William Gehrlein Michel Le Breton Dominique Lepelley Published in Social choice and welfare (01.08.2017)“...The purpose of this note is to compute the probability of logrolling for three different probabilistic cultures. The primary finding is that the restriction of...”
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15by William V. Gehrlein Dominique Lepelley Florenz Plassmann Published in Social choice and welfare (01.04.2016)“...We compare the Condorcet Efficiencies of the plurality rule, the negative plurality rule, and the Borda rule to address the question of what might be gained by...”
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16by Gehrlein, William V Gehrlein, William V Lepelley, Dominique Lepelley, Dominique Plassmann, Florenz Plassmann, Florenz Published in Homo oeconomicus (01.06.2018)“...We consider the potential benefit of obtaining a higher Condorcet Efficiency by using the two-stage election procedures Plurality Elimination Rule and Negative...”
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17by Friese, Erik Friese, Erik Gehrlein, William V Gehrlein, William V Lepelley, Dominique Lepelley, Dominique Schürmann, Achill Schürmann, Achill Published in Quality & quantity (01.11.2017)“...Standard weighted scoring rules do not directly accommodate the possibility that some voters might have dichotomous preferences in three-candidate elections...”
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19by Dominique Lepelley Ahmed Louichi Hatem Smaoui Published in Social choice and welfare (01.04.2008)“...In voting theory, analyzing the frequency of an event (e.g. a voting paradox), under some specific but widely used assumptions, is equivalent to computing the...”
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20by Fabrice Barthélémy Dominique Lepelley Mathieu Martin Published in Social choice and welfare (01.07.2013)“...When the number of players is small in a weighted majority voting game, it can occur that one of the players has no influence on the result of the vote, in...”