-
1by Nicolas Gabriel Andjiga Issofa Moyouwou Issofa Mouyouwou Joël Moulen Published in Annals of economics and statistics (01.01.2011)“...The Arrow theorem states that a social welfare function (SWF) that simultaneously satisfies completeness, transitivity, independence of irrelevant alternatives...”
-
2by Bertrand Tchantcho Lawrence Diffo Lambo Roland Pongou Joël Moulen Published in Social choice and welfare (01.03.2010)“...We study the core of "(j, k) simple games", where voters choose one level of approval from among j possible levels, partitioning the society into j coalitions,...”
-
3by Diffo Lambo, Lawrence Tchantcho, Bertrand Moulen, Joël Published in Mathematical social sciences (2009)“...This paper considers voting situations in which the vote takes place iteratively. If a coalition replaces the status quo a with a contestant b , then b becomes...”
-
4“...In this paper, we are concerned with the preorderings (SS) and (BC) induced in the set of players of a simple game by the Shapley–Shubik and the...”
-
5“...We characterize binary decision rules which are independent and strongly paretian,or independent and almost strongly paretian when the individual preferences...”
-
6by Andjiga, Nicolas-Gabriel Moulen, Joël Published in Mathématiques et sciences humaines (2000) (01.09.2003)“...The aim of this paper is to study the notion of Generalized Binary Constitution (GBC), a distribution of power due to Ferejohn and Fishburn (1979), which...”
-
8by MOUYOUWOU, Issofa MOULEN, Joël ANDJIGA, Nicolas Gabriel Published in Annales d'Economie et de Statistique (2011)“...Arrow’s theorem [1963] states that a social welfare function (SWF) that simultaneously satis.es completeness, transitivity, independence of irrelevant...”
-
9“...In this paper, we define the notion of binary game in constitutional form. For this game, we define a core and give a necessary and sufficient condition for a...”
-
10by Diffo Lambo, Lawrence Moulen, Joël Published in Mathématiques et sciences humaines (2000) (01.12.2000)“...Plusieurs théories de pouvoir a priori ont été introduites dans les jeux de vote. Sans être exhaustif, on peut citer : l'indice de Shapley-Shubik, l'indice...”
-
11
-
12by Andjiga, Nicolas Gabriel Mouyouwou, Issofa Moulen, Joël Published in Annals of Economics and Statistics (01.01.2011)“...Arrow’s theorem [1963] states that a social welfare function (SWF) that simultaneously satis.es completeness, transitivity, independence of irrelevant...”
-
14
-
15“...The aim of this paper is to study the notion of Generalized Binary Constitution (GBC), a distribution of power due to Ferejohn and Fishburn (1979), which...”
-
16
-
17“...Several a priori power concepts for voting games are available in the literature. To name only a few, we have the Shapely-Shubik and the Banzhaf-Coleman's...”
-
18by Diffo Lambo, Lawrence Tchantcho, Bertrand Moulen, Joël Published in Mathématiques et sciences humaines (2000) (01.03.2004)“...Nous étudions ce que nous appelons la relation de puissance. Cette relation binaire, définie sur l’ensemble des électeurs d’un jeu de vote, a permis dans...”
-
19“...We study the power relation ≥ P. This binary relation on the set of voters was used in [Diffo Lambo, Moulen, 2000] to show that the Taylor’s influence relation...”
-
20