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1by Roland Strausz Published in The American economic review (01.06.2017)“...Crowdfunding provides innovation in enabling entrepreneurs to contract with consumers before investment. Under aggregate demand uncertainty, this improves...”
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2by Levin J Published in The American economic review (01.06.2003)“...Standard incentive theory models provide a rich framework for studying informational problems but assume that contracts can be perfectly enforced. This paper...”
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3“...There is a large body of literature that concludes that-when confronted with increased competition-banks rationally choose more risky portfolios. We argue that...”
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4“...We derive a parsimonious rational model of active portfolio management that reproduces many regularities widely regarded as anomalous. Fund flows rationally...”
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5by Liran Einav Amy Finkelstein Stephen P. Ryan Paul Schrimpf Mark R. Cullen Published in The American economic review (01.02.2013)“...We use employee-level panel data from a single firm to explore the possibility that individuals may select insurance coverage in part based on their...”
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6“...Financial firms raise short-term debt to finance asset purchases; this induces risk shifting when economic conditions worsen and limits their ability to roll...”
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7by Gabriel Carroll Published in The American economic review (01.02.2015)“...We consider a moral hazard problem where the principal is uncertain as to what the agent can and cannot do: she knows some actions available to the agent, but...”
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8“...This paper proposes a perfectly competitive model of a market with adverse selection. Prices are determined by zero-profit conditions, and the set of traded...”
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9“...Performance-based contracting is reshaping service support supply chains in capital-intensive industries such as aerospace and defense. Known as "power by the...”
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10“...We develop a model in which the capital of the intermediary sector plays a critical role in determining asset prices. The model is cast within a dynamic...”
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11“...In this paper, we analyze the contracting issues that arise in collaborative services, such as consulting, financial planning, and information technology...”
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12“...This paper studies a model of long-term contracting for experimentation. We consider a principalagent relationship with adverse selection on the agent's...”
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13“...This paper examines moral hazard in teams over time. Agents are collectively engaged in a project whose duration and outcome are uncertain, and their...”
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14“...We survey the literature on dynamic elections in the traditional settings of spatial preferences and rent seeking under perfect and imperfect monitoring of...”
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15Observing Unobservables: Identifying Information Asymmetries with a Consumer Credit Field Experiment“...Information asymmetries are important in theory but difficult to identify in practice. We estimate the presence and importance of hidden information and hidden...”
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16by HUBER, JOHN D MARTINEZ-GALLARDO, CECILIA Published in The American political science review (01.05.2008)“...We examine the stability of individual ministers across parliamentary democracies. Our data show that this stability is only loosely related to the stability...”
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17by Fabian Herweg Daniel Müller Philipp Weinschenk Published in The American economic review (01.12.2010)“...We modify the principal-agent model with moral hazard by assuming that the agent is expectation-based loss averse according to Kőszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007)...”
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18by Bengt Holmström Published in The American economic review (01.07.2017)“...Incentives are often associated with narrow financial rewards such as bonuses or executive stock options. But in general such rewards are just a small part of...”
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19by Bruno Biais Thomas Mariotti Jean-Charles Rochet Stéphane Villeneuve Published in Econometrica (01.01.2010)“...We study a continuous-time principal—agent model in which a risk-neutral agent with limited liability must exert unobservable effort to reduce the likelihood...”
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20by BRUNO BIAIS FLORIAN HEIDER MARIE HOEROVA Published in The Journal of finance (New York) (01.08.2016)“...Derivatives activity, motivated by risk-sharing, can breed risk-taking. Bad news about the risk of an asset underlying a derivative increases protection...”