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1by Shakun D. Mago Anya C. Samak Roman M. Sheremeta Published in The Journal of conflict resolution (01.04.2016)“...We experimentally investigate the effect of social identification and information feedback on individual behavior in contests. In all treatments, we find...”
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2“...This article examines theory and behavior in a two-player game of siege, sequential attack and defense. The attacker's objective is to successfully win at...”
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3“...This study reports an experiment that examines whether groups can better comply with theoretical predictions than individuals in contests. Our experiment...”
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4“...We examine behavior of subjects in simultaneous and sequential multi-battle contests, where each individual battle is modeled as an all-pay auction with...”
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5“...This article examines behavior in the two-player, constant-sum Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric resources in which players maximize the expected number of...”
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6“...Studies show that identifying contributors increases contributions to public goods. In practice, viewing identifiable information is costly, which may...”
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7“...We construct a generalized Tullock contest under complete information where contingent upon winning or losing, the payoff of a player is a linear function of...”
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8by Roman M. Sheremeta Published in The Journal of conflict resolution (01.10.2010)“...This laboratory experiment studies two-stage contests between political parties. In the first stage, parties run their primaries, and in the second stage, the...”
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9by Sheremeta, Roman M Published in Journal of economic surveys (01.07.2018)“...Group contests are ubiquitous. Some examples include warfare between countries, competition between political parties, team‐incentives within firms, and...”
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10by Dechenaux, Emmanuel Dechenaux, Emmanuel Kovenock, Dan Kovenock, Dan Sheremeta, Roman M Sheremeta, Roman M Published in Experimental Economics (01.12.2015)“...Many economic, political and social environments can be described as contests in which agents exert costly effort while competing over the distribution of a...”
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11by Sheremeta, Roman M Published in The Behavioral and brain sciences (20190000)“...The attack-and-defense game is a game in which an attacker (a group of attackers) has an incentive to revise the status quo and a defender (a group of...”
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12by Sheremeta, Roman M Published in Journal of economic surveys (01.07.2013)“...We provide an overview of experimental literature on contests and point out the two main phenomena observed in most contest experiments: (i) overbidding...”
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13by SHEREMETA, ROMAN M Published in Economic inquiry (01.04.2011)“...This paper experimentally compares the performance of four simultaneous lottery contests: a grand contest, two multiple prize settings (equal and unequal...”
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14by Sheremeta, Roman M Published in Games and economic behavior (2010)“...This article experimentally studies a two-stage elimination contest and compares its performance with a one-stage contest. Contrary to the theory, the...”
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15“...The tug-of-war is a multi-battle contest often used to describe extended interactions in economics, operations management, political science, and other...”
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16“...Recognizing donors by revealing their identities is important for increasing charitable giving. Using a framed field experiment, we show that all forms of...”
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17by Clingingsmith, David Sheremeta, Roman M Published in Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic Science Association (01.12.2018)“...Some economists argue that consumption of publicly visible goods is driven by social status. Making a causal inference about this claim is difficult with...”
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18by Price, Curtis R Sheremeta, Roman M Published in Journal of economics & management strategy (Fall 2015)“...In modern firms the use of contests as an incentive device is ubiquitous. Nonetheless, experimental research shows that in the laboratory subjects routinely...”
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19by Chowdhury, Subhasish M Lee, Dongryul Sheremeta, Roman M Published in Journal of economic behavior & organization (01.08.2013)“...•We analyze a group contest with a group-specific public good prize.•Only the highest effort within each group represents the group effort.•In equilibrium at...”
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20by Schniter, Eric Sheremeta, Roman M Sznycer, Daniel Published in Journal of economic behavior & organization (01.10.2013)“...► Promises and messages are used to build new trust and rebuild damaged trust. ► Promise-breakers use apologies and upgraded promises to restore damaged trust...”