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21by Grund, Christian Sliwka, Dirk Published in Journal of economics & management strategy (01.03.2005)“...Many experiments and field studies indicate that most individuals are not purely motivated by material self‐interest but also care about the well being of...”
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22“...Drawing on two large German representative data sets, we analyze the role of works councils for the use of performance appraisals (PA). We distinguish between...”
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23“...We investigate the effects of inequality in wealth on the incentives to contribute to a group output when agents are inequity averse and may differ in ability...”
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24“...We investigate the causal effect of conversations about performance and performance pay implementing a 2x2 field experiment in a retail chain. In the...”
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25by Conrads, Julian Conrads, Julian Irlenbusch, Bernd Irlenbusch, Bernd Reggiani, Tommaso Reggiani, Tommaso Rilke, Rainer Michael Rilke, Rainer Michael Sliwka, Dirk Sliwka, Dirk Published in Experimental Economics (01.09.2016)“...How to hire voluntary helpers? We shed new light on this question by reporting a field experiment in which we invited 2859 students to help at the ‘ESA Europe...”
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26by Breuer, Kathrin Breuer, Kathrin Nieken, Petra Nieken, Petra Sliwka, Dirk Sliwka, Dirk Published in Review of managerial science (01.03.2013)“...We empirically investigate possible distortions in subjective performance evaluations. A key hypothesis is that evaluations are more upward biased the closer...”
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27“...We run two field experiments within a large retail chain showing that the effectiveness of performance pay crucially hinges on prior job experience...”
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28by McKenzie, Tom Sliwka, Dirk Published in Journal of institutional and theoretical economics (2011)“...We compare up-front tuition fees with graduate taxes for funding higher education. Graduate taxes transfer the volatility in future income from risk-averse...”
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29“...We study the performance effects of payment schemes for freelancers offering services on an online platform in an RCT. Under the initial scheme, the firm pays...”
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30by Christian Grund Dirk Sliwka Published in Journal of institutional and theoretical economics (01.06.2007)“...We study the impact of wage increases on job satisfaction theoretically and empirically. To do this, we apply a utility function that rises with the absolute...”
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31by Matthias Kräkel Dirk Sliwka Published in International economic review (Philadelphia) (01.02.2009)“...We discuss a principal-agent model in which the principal has the opportunity to include a noncompete agreement in the employment contract. We show that not...”
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32by Dirk Sliwka Published in Journal of law, economics, & organization (01.10.2006)“...We derive a natural definition of responsibility in a formal model in which employees care for their career prospects: A superior holds a subordinate...”
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33“...The impact of transparency on the extent of reciprocal behavior is investigated in a simple repeated gift exchange experiment where principals set wages and...”
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34“...We experimentally investigate a simple version of Holmström's career concerns model in which firms compete for agents in two consecutive periods. Profits of...”
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35by Sliwka, Dirk Published in Economics of governance (01.11.2003)“...A model is analyzed in which agents exert effort to create innovations within an organization. When payments are infeasible, the decision on the implementation...”
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36by Kräkel, Matthias Published in German economic review (Oxford) (01.02.2004)“...A tournament is examined in which two agents with different abilities choose efforts as well as risks. According to the previous literature, the more (less)...”
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37“...In this paper, we combine the strategic delegation approach of Fershtman–Judd–Sklivas with contests. Here a contest means the expenditure of resources in order...”
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38Do new brooms sweep clean? When and why dismissing a manager increases the subordinates’ performance“...If a manager stays in office for a long time he will have learned much about his subordinates. Thus competition among them will be weak as the manager has made...”
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39by Kajackaite, Agne Sliwka, Dirk Published in Journal of economic behavior & organization (01.04.2020)“...We argue that when contracts are incomplete it is not necessarily in the interest even of money maximizing shareholders to pick a manager who intends to...”
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40“...We investigate whether incentive schemes signal social norms and thus affect behavior beyond their direct economic consequences. A one-shot principal–agent...”