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1“...We provide sufficient conditions for the validity of the first-order approach for two-period dynamic moral hazard problems where the agent can save and borrow...”
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2“...Abstract We extend the model of risk sharing with limited commitment by introducing both a public and a private (unobservable and/or non-contractible) storage...”
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3“...This paper studies the design of unemployment insurance when neither the searching effort nor the savings of an unemployed agent can be monitored. If the...”
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4“...We study testable implications for the dynamics of consumption and income of models in which first-best allocations are not achieved because of a moral hazard...”
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5“...We propose a tractable recursive framework to study the optimal allocation of consumption and effort in a dynamic setting with moral hazard where agents have...”
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6by da Costa, Carlos E Published in Review of economic dynamics (2009)“...Golosov et al. [2003. Optimal indirect and capital taxation. Review of Economic Studies 70 (3), 569–587] have extended Atkinson and Stiglitz's uniform tax...”
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7by da Costa, Carlos Eugênio Ellery Lustosa Published in Review of Economic Dynamics (2009)“...Golosov et al. (2003) have extended Atkinson and Stiglitz's uniform tax prescription to a dynamic Mirrlees' (1971) economy under the assumption that the...”
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8“...We study testable implications for the dynamics of consumption and income of models in which first-best allocations are not achieved because of a moral hazard...”
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9by Panetti, Ettore“...In the present paper, I analyze how unobservable savings affect risk sharing and bankruptcy decisions in the financial system. I extend the Diamond and Dybvig...”
10.02.2011
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10by Panetti, Ettore“...In the present paper, I analyze how unobservable savings affect risk sharing and bankruptcy decisions in the financial system. I extend the Diamond and Dybvig...”
10.02.2011
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11“...This paper studies the design of unemployment insurance when neither the searching effort nor the savings of an unemployed agent can be monitored. If the...”
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12“...This paper studies the design of unemployment insurance when neither the searching effort nor the savings of an unemployed agent can be monitored. If the...”
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13“...We propose a tractable recursive framework to study the optimal allocation of consumption and effort in a dynamic setting with moral hazard where agents have...”
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14“...We propose a tractable recursive framework to study the optimal allocation of consumption and effort in a dynamic setting with moral hazard where agents have...”
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15“...We provide sufficient conditions for the validity of the first-order approach for two period dynamic moral hazard problems, where the agent can save and borrow...”
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16“...We provide sufficient conditions for the validity of the first-order approach for two-period dynamic moral hazard problems where the agent can save and borrow...”
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17by Koehne, S“...This paper proposes a general method to validate the first-order approach for moral hazard problems with hidden saving. I show that strong convexity...”
01.08.2009
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18by Koehne, S“...This paper proposes a general method to validate the first-order approach for moral hazard problems with hidden saving. I show that strong convexity...”
01.08.2009
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19
01.01.2008
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20“...We propose a tractable recursive framework to study the optimal allocation of consumption and effort in a dynamic setting with moral hazard where agents have...”