Reference Points and Redistributive Preferences: Experimental Evidence

If individuals evaluate outcomes relative to the status quo, then a social planner may limit redistribution from rich to poor even in the absence of moral hazard. We present two experiments suggesting that individuals, placed in the position of a social planner, do in fact respect the reference poin...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic details
Main Author: Fisman, Raymond
Kuziemko, Ilyana
Charité, Jimmy
Format: Paper
Language: English
Place of publication: National Bureau of Economic Research 01.03.2015
Data of publication: 20150301
Series: NBER Working Paper Series
Subjects:
Online Access: Fulltext
Database: NBER Working Papers
NBER
National Bureau of Economic Research Publications
NBER Technical Working Papers Archive
Database information Databases - DBIS