Multitasking and Subjective Performance Evaluations: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in a Bank

We study the incentive effects of granting supervisors access to objective performance information when agents work on multiple tasks. We first analyze a formal model showing that incentives are lower powered when supervisors have no access to objective measures but assess performance subjectively b...

Full description

Bibliographic details

Volume:	65
Main Author:	Manthei, Kathrin Sliwka, Dirk
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English
Zielgruppe:	Trade Academic
Place of publication:	CATONSVILLE INFORMS 01.12.2019 Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences
published in:	Management science Vol. 65; no. 12; pp. 5861 - 5883
ORCID:	0000-0002-8026-0165
Data of publication:	20191200
ISSN:	0025-1909 1526-5501
EISSN:	1526-5501
Discipline:	Business
Subjects:	incentives bank field experiment subjective performance evaluation multitasking Business & Economics Operations Research & Management Science Social Sciences Management Technology Science & Technology Banks (Finance) Iran Germany incentives bank field experiment subjective performance evaluation INCENTIVE CONTRACTS multitasking
Online Access:	available in Bonn?
Database:	Social Sciences Citation Index Web of Science - Science Citation Index Expanded - 2019 Web of Knowledge Science Citation Index Expanded Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index – 2019 Web of Science CrossRef Academic OneFile (A&I only) Database information Databases - DBIS