Multitasking and Subjective Performance Evaluations: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in a Bank

We study the incentive effects of granting supervisors access to objective performance information when agents work on multiple tasks. We first analyze a formal model showing that incentives are lower powered when supervisors have no access to objective measures but assess performance subjectively b...

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Bibliographic details
Volume: 65
Main Author: Manthei, Kathrin
Sliwka, Dirk
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Zielgruppe: Trade
Academic
Place of publication: CATONSVILLE INFORMS 01.12.2019
Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences
published in: Management science Vol. 65; no. 12; pp. 5861 - 5883
ORCID: 0000-0002-8026-0165
Data of publication: 20191200
ISSN: 0025-1909
1526-5501
EISSN: 1526-5501
Discipline: Business
Subjects:
Online Access: available in Bonn?
Database: Social Sciences Citation Index
Web of Science - Science Citation Index Expanded - 2019
Web of Knowledge
Science Citation Index Expanded
Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index – 2019
Web of Science
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