Physician Payment Contracts in the Presence of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection: The Theory and Its Application in Ontario

We develop a stylized principal–agent model with moral hazard and adverse selection to provide a unified framework for understanding some of the most salient features of the recent physician payment reform in Ontario and its impact on physician behavior. These features include the following: (i) phy...

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Bibliographic details
Volume: 25
Main Author: Kantarevic, Jasmin
Kralj, Boris
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Zielgruppe: Academic
Place of publication: HOBOKEN WILEY 01.10.2016
Wiley Subscription Services, Inc
published in: Health economics Vol. 25; no. 10; pp. 1326 - 1340
Data of publication: October 2016
ISSN: 1057-9230
1099-1050
EISSN: 1099-1050
Discipline: Medicine
Public Health
Economics
Subjects:
Online Access: available in Bonn?
Database: Social Sciences Citation Index
Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index - 2016
Web of Knowledge
Science Citation Index Expanded
Web of Science - Science Citation Index Expanded - 2016
Web of Science
MEDLINE (Ovid)
PubMed
MEDLINE
MEDLINE
MEDLINE
Medline
Academic OneFile (A&I only)
MEDLINE - Academic
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