Physician Payment Contracts in the Presence of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection: The Theory and Its Application in Ontario

We develop a stylized principal–agent model with moral hazard and adverse selection to provide a unified framework for understanding some of the most salient features of the recent physician payment reform in Ontario and its impact on physician behavior. These features include the following: (i) phy...

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Bibliographic details

Volume:	25
Main Author:	Kantarevic, Jasmin Kralj, Boris
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English
Zielgruppe:	Academic
Place of publication:	HOBOKEN WILEY 01.10.2016 Wiley Subscription Services, Inc
published in:	Health economics Vol. 25; no. 10; pp. 1326 - 1340
Data of publication:	October 2016
ISSN:	1057-9230 1099-1050
EISSN:	1099-1050
Discipline:	Medicine Public Health Economics
Subjects:	moral hazard physician remuneration adverse selection Ontario Economics Social Sciences Life Sciences & Biomedicine Health Care Sciences & Services Business & Economics Health Policy & Services Science & Technology Fee-for-Service Plans - statistics & numerical data Humans Female Male Contract Services - methods Physicians - economics Capitation Fee - statistics & numerical data Health Expenditures Physicians - statistics & numerical data Fee-for-Service Plans - economics Physicians Medical ethics Index Medicus MATCHING ESTIMATORS QUALITY PROPENSITY SCORE moral hazard INCENTIVES physician remuneration COST PRIMARY-CARE BOOTSTRAP COMPETITION SYSTEMS HEALTH adverse selection Ontario
Online Access:	available in Bonn?
Database:	Social Sciences Citation Index Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index - 2016 Web of Knowledge Science Citation Index Expanded Web of Science - Science Citation Index Expanded - 2016 Web of Science MEDLINE (Ovid) PubMed MEDLINE MEDLINE MEDLINE Medline Academic OneFile (A&I only) MEDLINE - Academic Database information Databases - DBIS