The spite motive in third price auctions

A spiteful agent losing an auction experiences negative emotions towards the winner. In line with previous experimental findings I show that the symmetric equilibrium bid of a spiteful agent in third price auctions is higher than the risk neural Nash equilibrium bid. Furthermore, it can be shown tha...

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Bibliographic details
Volume: 161
Main Author: Mill, Wladislaw
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Zielgruppe: Academic
Place of publication: LAUSANNE Elsevier B.V 01.12.2017
ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
published in: Economics letters Vol. 161; pp. 71 - 73
Data of publication: December 2017
ISSN: 0165-1765
1873-7374
EISSN: 1873-7374
Discipline: Economics
Subjects:
D44
D81
C72
Online Access: available in Bonn?
Database: Social Sciences Citation Index
Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index - 2017
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