The spite motive in third price auctions

A spiteful agent losing an auction experiences negative emotions towards the winner. In line with previous experimental findings I show that the symmetric equilibrium bid of a spiteful agent in third price auctions is higher than the risk neural Nash equilibrium bid. Furthermore, it can be shown tha...

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Bibliographic details
Volume:	161
Main Author:	Mill, Wladislaw
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English
Zielgruppe:	Academic
Place of publication:	LAUSANNE Elsevier B.V 01.12.2017 ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
published in:	Economics letters Vol. 161; pp. 71 - 73
Data of publication:	December 2017
ISSN:	0165-1765 1873-7374
EISSN:	1873-7374
Discipline:	Economics
Subjects:	Spite Overbidding Auction Anticipated regret Economics Business & Economics Social Sciences Auctions Game theory D44 Overbidding Auction Spite D81 Anticipated regret C72 INFORMATION BEHAVIOR ALL-PAY AUCTIONS DILEMMA PRIVATE-VALUE AUCTIONS
Online Access:	available in Bonn?
Database:	Social Sciences Citation Index Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index - 2017 Web of Knowledge Web of Science CrossRef Academic OneFile (A&I only) Database information Databases - DBIS