Bonus versus penalty: How robust are the effects of contract framing?

We study the relative effectiveness of contracts that are framed either in terms of bonuses or penalties. In one set of treatments, subjects know at the time of effort provision whether they have achieved the bonus/avoided the penalty. In another set of treatments, subjects only learn the success of...

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Bibliographic details
Volume: 3
Main Author: de Quidt, Jonathan
Fallucchi, Francesco
Kölle, Felix
Nosenzo, Daniele
Quercia, Simone
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Place of publication: New York Springer US 01.12.2017
Springer Nature B.V
published in: Journal of the Economic Science Association Vol. 3; no. 2; pp. 174 - 182
Data of publication: 20171200
ISSN: 2199-6776
2199-6784
2199-6784
EISSN: 2199-6784
Discipline: Economics
Subjects:
D03
J24
C9
Online Access: Fulltext
Database: Springer Journals Complete - Open Access
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MEDLINE - Academic
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