Unintended Effects of Anonymous Résumés

We evaluate an experimental program in which the French public employment service anonymized résumés for firms that were hiring. Firms were free to participate or not; participating firms were then randomly assigned to receive either anonymous résumés or name-bearing ones. We find that participating...

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Bibliographic details
Volume:	7
Main Author:	Luc Behaghel Bruno Crépon Thomas Le Barbanchon
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English
Place of publication:	NASHVILLE American Economic Association 01.07.2015 AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC
published in:	American economic journal. Applied economics Vol. 7; no. 3; pp. 1 - 27
Data of publication:	20150701
ISSN:	1945-7782 1945-7790
EISSN:	1945-7790
Discipline:	Economics
Subjects:	Statistical significance Control groups Resumes Survey sampling Hiring Labor markets Random allocation Employment statistics Employment interviews Employment discrimination Economics Business & Economics Social Sciences FIELD EXPERIMENT DISCRIMINATION
Online Access:	Fulltext
Database:	Social Sciences Citation Index Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index - 2015 Web of Knowledge Web of Science CrossRef Database information Databases - DBIS