Inherited Institutions: Cooperation in the Light of Democratic Legitimacy

We experimentally investigate whether the procedural history of a sanctioning institution affects cooperation in a social dilemma. Subjects inherit the institutional setting from a previous generation of subjects who either decided on the implementation of the institution democratically by majority...

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Bibliographic details
Volume: 35
Main Author: Langenbach, Pascal
Tausch, Franziska
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Zielgruppe: Professional
Place of publication: CARY OXFORD UNIV PRESS INC 01.07.2019
Oxford University Press
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Discussion Paper 2017/1
published in: Journal of law, economics, & organization Vol. 35; no. 2; pp. 364 - 393
Data of publication: 2019-07-01
ISSN: 8756-6222
1465-7341
EISSN: 1465-7341
Dewey Decimal Classification: 330
Discipline: Economics
Law
Subjects:
Law
Online Access: available in Bonn?
Database: Social Sciences Citation Index
Web of Knowledge
Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index – 2019
Web of Science
ECONIS
CrossRef
Gale General OneFile (A&I only)
Academic OneFile (A&I only)
OpenAIRE
OpenAIRE (Open Access)
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