Long-term absenteeism and moral hazard—Evidence from a natural experiment

This paper shows that long-term sick employees are unlikely to be very responsive to moderate monetary labor supply incentives. The paper, theoretically and empirically, evaluates the labor supply effects of cuts in statutory sick pay levels on long-term absenteeism in Germany. Cutting sick pay did...

Full description

Saved in:

Bibliographic details
Volume:	24
Main Author:	Ziebarth, Nicolas R
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English
Zielgruppe:	Academic
Place of publication:	AMSTERDAM Elsevier B.V 01.10.2013 ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV Elsevier Science Ltd
published in:	Labour economics Vol. 24; pp. 277 - 292
ORCID:	0000-0003-3562-2371
Data of publication:	October 2013
ISSN:	0927-5371 1879-1034
EISSN:	1879-1034
Discipline:	Economics
Subjects:	Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) Long-term absenteeism Statutory long-term sick pay Moral hazard Natural experiment Economics Business & Economics Social Sciences Labor market Analysis Worker absenteeism Studies Labor economics Labor supply Economic models Sick leave Absenteeism Germany I18 D31 H51 D03 J32 Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) J22 Long-term absenteeism Statutory long-term sick pay Moral hazard Natural experiment DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES WORKERS-COMPENSATION SICKNESS ABSENCE ECONOMIC INCENTIVES INFERENCE DISABILITY INSURANCE BENEFITS HEALTH EFFICIENCY WAGES DURATION UNEMPLOYMENT
Online Access:	available in Bonn?
Database:	Social Sciences Citation Index Web of Knowledge Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index - 2013 Web of Science CrossRef Academic OneFile (A&I only) Database information Databases - DBIS