Testing for Asymmetric Employer Learning

Recent evidence suggests that employers acquire more precise information about a worker’s productivity the more time he or she spends in the labor market. The following question arises: Is learning symmetric, that is, do all employers have the same information about workers’ productivity, or is lear...

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Bibliographic details
Volume: 25
Main Author: Uta Schönberg
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Zielgruppe: Trade
Place of publication: CHICAGO The University of Chicago Press 01.10.2007
University of Chicago Press
published in: Journal of labor economics Vol. 25; no. 4; pp. 651 - 691
Data of publication: 20071000
ISSN: 0734-306X
EISSN: 1537-5307
Alternate Title: Testing for Asymmetric Employer Learning
Discipline: Economics
Online Access: Fulltext
Database: Social Sciences Citation Index
Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index - 2007
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