Punishment and counter-punishment in public good games: Can we really govern ourselves?
A number of experimental studies have shown that the opportunity to punish anti-social behavior increases cooperation levels when agents face a social dilemma. Using a public good experiment, I show that in the presence of counter-punishment opportunities cooperators are less willing to punish free...
|Main Author:||Nikiforakis, Nikos|
|Place of publication:||
LAUSANNE Elsevier B.V 2008
ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
|published in:||Journal of public economics Vol. 92; no. 1; pp. 91 - 112|
|Data of publication:||2008|
Journal of Public Economics
|Online Access:||available in Bonn?|
|Database:||Social Sciences Citation Index
Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index - 2008
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