Punishment and counter-punishment in public good games: Can we really govern ourselves?

A number of experimental studies have shown that the opportunity to punish anti-social behavior increases cooperation levels when agents face a social dilemma. Using a public good experiment, I show that in the presence of counter-punishment opportunities cooperators are less willing to punish free...

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Bibliographic details

Volume:	92
Main Author:	Nikiforakis, Nikos
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English
Place of publication:	LAUSANNE Elsevier B.V 2008 ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA Elsevier
published in:	Journal of public economics Vol. 92; no. 1; pp. 91 - 112
Data of publication:	2008
ISSN:	0047-2727 1879-2316
EISSN:	1879-2316
Discipline:	Economics Mathematics Political Science
Series:	Journal of Public Economics
Subjects:	Decentralized punishment Experimental economics Public goods Revenge Counter-punishment Economics Business & Economics Social Sciences Experimental economics H41 Decentralized punishment Public goods D70 Revenge C92 Counter-punishment SANCTIONING SYSTEM counter-punishment REPUTATION revenge MECHANISM public goods COOPERATION PROVISION ALTRUISTIC PUNISHMENT DEMAND decentralized punishment MONETARY experimental economics
Online Access:	available in Bonn?
Database:	Social Sciences Citation Index Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index - 2008 Web of Knowledge Web of Science RePEc RePEc IDEAS CrossRef Database information Databases - DBIS