Transparency, Inequity Aversion, and the Dynamics of Peer Pressure in Teams: Theory and Evidence

We provide an explanation for peer pressure in teams based on inequity aversion. Analyzing a two‐period model with two agents, we find that the effect of inequity aversion strongly depends on the information structure. When contributions are unobservable, agents act as though they were purely selfis...

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Bibliographic details
Volume: 26
Main Author: Alwine Mohnen
Kathrin Pokorny
Dirk Sliwka
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Zielgruppe: Trade
Place of publication: CHICAGO The University of Chicago Press 01.10.2008
University of Chicago Press
published in: Journal of labor economics Vol. 26; no. 4; pp. 693 - 720
Data of publication: 20081000
ISSN: 0734-306X
EISSN: 1537-5307
Alternate Title: Peer Pressure in Teams
Discipline: Economics
Online Access: Fulltext
Database: Social Sciences Citation Index
Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index - 2008
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