Biasing selection contests with ex-ante identical agents

This note shows that when the designer of a contest wishes the winner have high ability, she is better off giving a head start to one of the contestants even if they are ex-ante identical. If the contestants are ex-ante asymmetric, the designer should give a head start to the one who is more likely...

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Bibliographic details
Volume: 123
Main Author: Kawamura, Kohei
Moreno de Barreda, Inés
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Zielgruppe: Academic
Place of publication: LAUSANNE Elsevier B.V 01.05.2014
ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
published in: Economics letters Vol. 123; no. 2; pp. 240 - 243
Data of publication: May 2014
ISSN: 0165-1765
1873-7374
EISSN: 1873-7374
Discipline: Economics
Subjects:
C72
D82
Online Access: available in Bonn?
Database: Web of Knowledge
Social Sciences Citation Index
Web of Science
Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index - 2014
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Academic OneFile (A&I only)
Database information Databases - DBIS