Trust as a Signal of a Social Norm and the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes

An explanation for motivation crowding-out phenomena is developed in a social preferences framework. Besides selfish and fair or altruistic types, a third type of agent is introduced. These “conformists” have social preferences if they believe that sufficiently many of the others do as well. When th...

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Bibliographic details

Volume:	97
Main Author:	Dirk Sliwka
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English
Zielgruppe:	Academic
Place of publication:	NASHVILLE American Economic Association 01.06.2007 AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC
published in:	The American economic review Vol. 97; no. 3; pp. 999 - 1012
ORCID:	0000-0002-8026-0165
Data of publication:	20070601
ISSN:	0002-8282 1944-7981
EISSN:	1944-7981
Discipline:	Economics Law
Subjects:	Economic models Economic motivation Motivation Working papers Motivation research Financial incentives Economic costs Conformity Social norms Contract incentives Economics Business & Economics Social Sciences Influence Trust (Psychology) Personal preferences (Social sciences) Analysis PAY FAIRNESS INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS MOTIVATION UNEMPLOYMENT
Online Access:	Fulltext
Database:	Social Sciences Citation Index Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index - 2007 Web of Knowledge Web of Science CrossRef Academic OneFile (A&I only) Database information Databases - DBIS