Trust as a Signal of a Social Norm and the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes

An explanation for motivation crowding-out phenomena is developed in a social preferences framework. Besides selfish and fair or altruistic types, a third type of agent is introduced. These “conformists” have social preferences if they believe that sufficiently many of the others do as well. When th...

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Bibliographic details
Volume: 97
Main Author: Dirk Sliwka
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Zielgruppe: Academic
Place of publication: NASHVILLE American Economic Association 01.06.2007
AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC
published in: The American economic review Vol. 97; no. 3; pp. 999 - 1012
ORCID: 0000-0002-8026-0165
Data of publication: 20070601
ISSN: 0002-8282
1944-7981
EISSN: 1944-7981
Discipline: Economics
Law
Subjects:
PAY
Online Access: Fulltext
Database: Social Sciences Citation Index
Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index - 2007
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