Rational expectations equilibrium and the strategic choice of costly information

This paper studies costly information acquisition in one-good production economies when agents acquire private information and prices transmit information. Before asset markets open, agents choose the quality of their private information. After this information stage, agents trade assets in sequenti...

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Bibliographic details
Volume: 43
Main Author: Krebs, Tom
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Zielgruppe: Academic
Place of publication: LAUSANNE Elsevier B.V 2007
ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
Elsevier
published in: Journal of mathematical economics Vol. 43; no. 5; pp. 532 - 548
Data of publication: 2007
ISSN: 0304-4068
Discipline: Economics
Mathematics
Series: Journal of Mathematical Economics
Subjects:
G14
D50
D82
Online Access: available in Bonn?
Database: Social Sciences Citation Index
Web of Science - Science Citation Index Expanded - 2007
Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index - 2007
Web of Knowledge
Science Citation Index Expanded
Web of Science
RePEc
RePEc IDEAS
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Academic OneFile (A&I only)
Database information Databases - DBIS