Rational expectations equilibrium and the strategic choice of costly information

This paper studies costly information acquisition in one-good production economies when agents acquire private information and prices transmit information. Before asset markets open, agents choose the quality of their private information. After this information stage, agents trade assets in sequenti...

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Bibliographic details

Volume:	43
Main Author:	Krebs, Tom
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English
Zielgruppe:	Academic
Place of publication:	LAUSANNE Elsevier B.V 2007 ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA Elsevier
published in:	Journal of mathematical economics Vol. 43; no. 5; pp. 532 - 548
Data of publication:	2007
ISSN:	0304-4068
Discipline:	Economics Mathematics
Series:	Journal of Mathematical Economics
Subjects:	Information acquisition Rational expectations equilibrium Economics Mathematics, Interdisciplinary Applications Physical Sciences Social Sciences Social Sciences, Mathematical Methods Business & Economics Mathematics Mathematical Methods In Social Sciences Science & Technology G14 Information acquisition D50 Rational expectations equilibrium D82 PRICES rational expectations equilibrium information acquisition MARKETS ECONOMY
Online Access:	available in Bonn?
Database:	Social Sciences Citation Index Web of Science - Science Citation Index Expanded - 2007 Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index - 2007 Web of Knowledge Science Citation Index Expanded Web of Science RePEc RePEc IDEAS CrossRef Academic OneFile (A&I only) Database information Databases - DBIS