Preferences and beliefs in a sequential social dilemma: a within-subjects analysis

In empirical analyses of games, preferences and beliefs are typically treated as independent. However, if beliefs and preferences interact, this may have implications for the interpretation of observed behavior. Our sequential social dilemma experiment allows us to separate different interaction cha...

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Bibliographic details

Volume:	87
Main Author:	Blanco, Mariana Engelmann, Dirk Koch, Alexander K Normann, Hans-Theo
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English
Zielgruppe:	Academic
Place of publication:	SAN DIEGO Elsevier Inc 01.09.2014 ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE Elsevier B.V Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
published in:	Games and economic behavior Vol. 87; pp. 122 - 135
ORCID:	0000-0002-0242-5948 0000-0001-9471-1636 0000-0002-2458-1327
Data of publication:	September 2014
ISSN:	0899-8256 1090-2473
EISSN:	1090-2473
Classification Codes:
Dewey Decimal Classification:	330
Discipline:	Psychology Mathematics Economics
Subjects:	Experimental economics Beliefs Social dilemma Consensus effect Economics Business & Economics Social Sciences experimental economics, consensus effect, social dilemmas consensus effect Gefangenendilemma Präferenztheorie Test social dilemmas experimental economics Erwartungstheorie Beliefs,consensus effect,social dilemma,experimental economics Experimental economics C90 Beliefs Social dilemma Consensus effect C72 GAMES STATED BELIEFS FEAR PLAY GREED FAIRNESS AVERSION RECIPROCITY PRISONERS-DILEMMA TRUST
Online Access:	available in Bonn?
Database:	Social Sciences Citation Index Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index - 2014 Web of Knowledge Web of Science CrossRef Academic OneFile (A&I only) OpenAIRE OpenAIRE (Open Access) Database information Databases - DBIS