Preferences and beliefs in a sequential social dilemma: a within-subjects analysis

In empirical analyses of games, preferences and beliefs are typically treated as independent. However, if beliefs and preferences interact, this may have implications for the interpretation of observed behavior. Our sequential social dilemma experiment allows us to separate different interaction cha...

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Bibliographic details
Volume: 87
Main Author: Blanco, Mariana
Engelmann, Dirk
Koch, Alexander K
Normann, Hans-Theo
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Zielgruppe: Academic
Place of publication: SAN DIEGO Elsevier Inc 01.09.2014
ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
Elsevier B.V
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
published in: Games and economic behavior Vol. 87; pp. 122 - 135
ORCID: 0000-0002-0242-5948
0000-0001-9471-1636
0000-0002-2458-1327
Data of publication: September 2014
ISSN: 0899-8256
1090-2473
EISSN: 1090-2473
Classification Codes:

Dewey Decimal Classification: 330
Discipline: Psychology
Mathematics
Economics
Subjects:
C90
C72
Online Access: available in Bonn?
Database: Social Sciences Citation Index
Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index - 2014
Web of Knowledge
Web of Science
CrossRef
Academic OneFile (A&I only)
OpenAIRE
OpenAIRE (Open Access)
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