Regulating Unverifiable Quality by Fixed-Price Contracts

We apply the idea of relational contracting to a simple problem of regulating a single-product monopoly with unverifiable (then ex ante not contractible) quality. We model the interaction between the regulator and the firm as an infinitely repeated game; we observe that there exist self-enforcing co...

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Bibliographic details
Volume: 12
Main Author: Cesi, Berardino
Iozzi, Alberto
Valentini, Edilio
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Place of publication: BERLIN De Gruyter 25.09.2012
WALTER DE GRUYTER GMBH
published in: The B.E. journal of economic analysis & policy Vol. 12; no. 1
Data of publication: 2012-09-25
ISSN: 1935-1682
1935-1682
EISSN: 1935-1682
Discipline: Economics
Subjects:
Online Access: Fulltext
Database: Istex
Web of Knowledge
Social Sciences Citation Index
Web of Science
Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index - 2012
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Database information Databases - DBIS