The dark side of team incentives: Experimental evidence on advice quality from financial service professionals

•We run sender-receiver game with financial service professionals.•2×2 design: team and individual incentives, close and loose team affiliation.•Team bonus reduces recommendation quality when social ties are close.•Under close group affiliation, individual incentives lead to more honest behavior.•No...

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Bibliographic details
Volume: 93
Main Author: Danilov, Anastasia
Biemann, Torsten
Kring, Thorn
Sliwka, Dirk
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Zielgruppe: Academic
Place of publication: AMSTERDAM Elsevier B.V 01.09.2013
ELSEVIER
published in: Journal of economic behavior & organization Vol. 93; pp. 266 - 272
Data of publication: September 2013
ISSN: 0167-2681
1879-1751
EISSN: 1879-1751
Discipline: Business
Economics
Subjects:
G20
J30
C91
M52
C92
D82
Online Access: available in Bonn?
Database: Social Sciences Citation Index
Web of Knowledge
Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index - 2013
Web of Science
CrossRef
Academic OneFile (A&I only)
Database information Databases - DBIS