The dark side of team incentives: Experimental evidence on advice quality from financial service professionals

•We run sender-receiver game with financial service professionals.•2×2 design: team and individual incentives, close and loose team affiliation.•Team bonus reduces recommendation quality when social ties are close.•Under close group affiliation, individual incentives lead to more honest behavior.•No...

Full description

Saved in:

Bibliographic details
Volume:	93
Main Author:	Danilov, Anastasia Biemann, Torsten Kring, Thorn Sliwka, Dirk
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English
Zielgruppe:	Academic
Place of publication:	AMSTERDAM Elsevier B.V 01.09.2013 ELSEVIER
published in:	Journal of economic behavior & organization Vol. 93; pp. 266 - 272
Data of publication:	September 2013
ISSN:	0167-2681 1879-1751
EISSN:	1879-1751
Discipline:	Business Economics
Subjects:	Team incentives Sender-receiver game Financial advice Misadvising Deception Experiment Economics Business & Economics Social Sciences Team incentives G20 Financial advice J30 Deception Experiment C91 M52 Sender-receiver game C92 Misadvising D82 PERSONALITY BEHAVIOR SCALE
Online Access:	available in Bonn?
Database:	Social Sciences Citation Index Web of Knowledge Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index - 2013 Web of Science CrossRef Academic OneFile (A&I only) Database information Databases - DBIS