Mixed up? That's Good for Motivation

We show that career concerns can arise in the absence of ex ante uncertainty about an agent's type, if his unobservable actions influence future productivity. Implementing effort in mixed strategies allows the principal to endogenously introduce uncertainty about the agent's ex post produc...

Full description

Bibliographic details

Volume:	34
Main Author:	Alexander K. Koch Eloïc Peyrache
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English
Place of publication:	Berlin/Heidelberg Springer 01.01.2008 Springer-Verlag SPRINGER Springer Verlag
published in:	Economic theory Vol. 34; no. 1; pp. 107 - 125
ORCID:	0000-0001-9471-1636
Data of publication:	20080101
ISSN:	0938-2259 1432-0479
EISSN:	1432-0479
Discipline:	Economics
Subjects:	Risk aversion Human capital Financial risk Labor markets Mixed strategy Financial incentives Applicant screening Limited liability Contract incentives Learning by doing Economics general Incentive contracts Mixed strategies Analysis Economic Theory Reputation J33 D80 L14 Economics / Management Science M12 Economics Business & Economics Social Sciences domain_shs.eco.eco Economics and Finance Humanities and Social Sciences CAREER CONCERNS human capital COMMITMENT incentive contracts mixed strategies NEWS reputation REVELATION Incentive contracts Mixed strategies Human capital Reputation
Online Access:	Fulltext
Database:	Social Sciences Citation Index Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index - 2008 Web of Knowledge Web of Science CrossRef Hyper Article en Ligne (HAL) HAL-SHS: Archive ouverte en Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société Database information Databases - DBIS