The Incumbency Effects of Signalling

Much literature on political behaviour treats politicians as motivated by re-election, choosing actions to signal their types to voters. We identify a novel implication of incumbent signalling. Because incumbents only care about clearing a re-election hurdle, signals will tend to cluster just above...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic details
Volume: 81
Main Author: Francesco Caselli
Tom Cunningham
Massimo Morelli
Inés Moreno de Barreda
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Zielgruppe: Academic
Place of publication: HOBOKEN Blackwell Publishing Ltd 01.07.2014
WILEY-BLACKWELL
Wiley Subscription Services, Inc
published in: Economica (London) Vol. 81; no. 323; pp. 397 - 418
Data of publication: 20140701
ISSN: 0013-0427
1468-0335
EISSN: 1468-0335
Discipline: Economics
Subjects:
Online Access: Fulltext
Database: Social Sciences Citation Index
Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index - 2014
Web of Knowledge
Web of Science
CrossRef
Gale General OneFile (A&I only)
Academic OneFile (A&I only)
Database information Databases - DBIS