Uncertainty and the Politics of Employment Protection

This paper investigates social preferences over employment protection regulation in a general equilibrium model of dynamic labor demand and sheds some light on the comparative dynamics of Eurosclerosis. When firing costs are low, a transition to a rigid labor market is favored by all the employed wo...

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Bibliographic details

Volume:	33
Main Author:	Andrea Vindigni Simone Scotti Cristina Tealdi
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English
Zielgruppe:	Trade Academic
Place of publication:	CHICAGO University of Chicago Press 01.01.2015 UNIV CHICAGO PRESS
published in:	Journal of labor economics Vol. 33; no. 1; pp. 209 - 267
Data of publication:	20150101
ISSN:	0734-306X 1537-5307
EISSN:	1537-5307
Discipline:	Economics
Subjects:	Productivity Capital costs Economic models Employment Employment termination Labor markets Economic rent Unemployment Job creation Mathematical expressions Economics Business & Economics Social Sciences Industrial Relations & Labor Industrial productivity Labor market Labor law Analysis LABOR-MARKET FLEXIBILITY SEVERANCE PAYMENTS WAGE JOB SECURITY FIRING COSTS TURNOVER EQUILIBRIUM CONSEQUENCES UNEMPLOYMENT ECONOMY
Online Access:	Fulltext
Database:	Social Sciences Citation Index Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index - 2015 Web of Knowledge Web of Science CrossRef Academic OneFile (A&I only) Database information Databases - DBIS