Worker Absenteeism and Incentives: Evidence from Italy

In Italy, employees are fully insured against earning losses due to illness. Since worker's health is not easily verifiable, absenteeism due to illness is considered an empirical proxy for employee shirking. The Bank of Italy Household Survey (SHIW) provides individual data on days of absence....

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Bibliographic details
Volume: 31
Main Author: Vincenzo Scoppa
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Zielgruppe: Trade
Academic
Place of publication: Chichester, UK John Wiley and Sons 01.12.2010
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd
John Wiley & Sons, Inc
published in: Managerial and decision economics Vol. 31; no. 8; pp. 503 - 515
Data of publication: 20101201
ISSN: 0143-6570
1099-1468
EISSN: 1099-1468
Discipline: Business
Statistics
Series: Managerial and Decision Economics
Subjects:
Online Access: Fulltext
Database: RePEc
RePEc IDEAS
CrossRef
Academic OneFile (A&I only)
Database information Databases - DBIS