Worker Absenteeism and Incentives: Evidence from Italy

In Italy, employees are fully insured against earning losses due to illness. Since worker's health is not easily verifiable, absenteeism due to illness is considered an empirical proxy for employee shirking. The Bank of Italy Household Survey (SHIW) provides individual data on days of absence....

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Bibliographic details
Volume:	31
Main Author:	Vincenzo Scoppa
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English
Zielgruppe:	Trade Academic
Place of publication:	Chichester, UK John Wiley and Sons 01.12.2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd John Wiley & Sons, Inc
published in:	Managerial and decision economics Vol. 31; no. 8; pp. 503 - 515
Data of publication:	20101201
ISSN:	0143-6570 1099-1468
EISSN:	1099-1468
Discipline:	Business Statistics
Series:	Managerial and Decision Economics
Subjects:	Self employment Workplace absenteeism Health status Employment Employment termination Employees Unemployment Public sector Contract incentives Diseases Occupational health and safety Employee incentives Worker absenteeism Management Statistics Italy
Online Access:	Fulltext
Database:	RePEc RePEc IDEAS CrossRef Academic OneFile (A&I only) Database information Databases - DBIS