Optimum income taxation and layoff taxes

This paper analyzes optimum income taxation in a model with endogenous job destruction that gives rise to unemployment. It is shown that optimal tax schemes comprise both payroll and layoff taxes when the state provides public unemployment insurance and aims at redistributing income. The optimal lay...

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Bibliographic details

Volume:	92
Main Author:	Cahuc, Pierre Zylberberg, André
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English
Zielgruppe:	Trade Academic
Place of publication:	LAUSANNE Elsevier B.V 2008 ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA Elsevier
published in:	Journal of public economics Vol. 92; no. 10; pp. 2003 - 2019
Data of publication:	2008
ISSN:	0047-2727 1879-2316
EISSN:	1879-2316
Discipline:	Economics Mathematics Political Science
Series:	Journal of Public Economics
Subjects:	Layoff taxes Optimal taxation H21 H32 J65 J38 Job destruction Economics Business & Economics Social Sciences H21 H32 J38 J65 Layoff taxes Optimal taxation Job destruction Layoffs Taxation Economics and Finance Humanities and Social Sciences Layoff taxes Optimal taxation H21 H32 J65 J38 Job destruction WAGES COMPENSATION EMPLOYMENT UNEMPLOYMENT-INSURANCE IMPLICIT CONTRACTS
Online Access:	available in Bonn?
Database:	Social Sciences Citation Index Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index - 2008 Web of Knowledge Web of Science RePEc RePEc IDEAS CrossRef Academic OneFile (A&I only) Hyper Article en Ligne (HAL) (Open Access) Hyper Article en Ligne (HAL) HAL-SHS: Archive ouverte en Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société HAL-SHS: Archive ouverte en Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société (Open Access) Database information Databases - DBIS