TURNING A BLIND EYE: COSTLY ENFORCEMENT, CREDIBLE COMMITMENT AND MINIMUM WAGE LAWS

In many countries, non-compliance with minimum wage legislation is widespread and authorities may be seen as having turned a blind eye to legislation they have themselves passed. We show that turning a blind eye can indeed be an equilibrium phenomenon with ex post credibility, in a model of minimum...

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Bibliographic details
Volume: 120
Main Author: Arnab K. Basu
Nancy H. Chau
Ravi Kanbur
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Zielgruppe: Trade
Academic
Place of publication: Oxford, UK Blackwell Publishing 01.03.2010
Blackwell Publishing Ltd
WILEY-BLACKWELL PUBLISHING, INC
Wiley Subscription Services, Inc
published in: The Economic journal (London) Vol. 120; no. 543; pp. 244 - 269
Data of publication: 20100301
ISSN: 0013-0133
1468-0297
EISSN: 1468-0297
Discipline: Economics
Bibliography: and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and stimulating discussions. The usual disclaimer applies.
Journal
We thank Gary Fields, Mick Keen, Russ Krelove, Jonathan Thomas, seminar participants at Edinburgh, the IMF, and Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), members of the Cornell‐SEWA‐WIEGO Exposure and Dialogue Group, an Editor of this
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Online Access: Fulltext
Database: Social Sciences Citation Index
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