TURNING A BLIND EYE: COSTLY ENFORCEMENT, CREDIBLE COMMITMENT AND MINIMUM WAGE LAWS

In many countries, non-compliance with minimum wage legislation is widespread and authorities may be seen as having turned a blind eye to legislation they have themselves passed. We show that turning a blind eye can indeed be an equilibrium phenomenon with ex post credibility, in a model of minimum...

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Bibliographic details

Volume:	120
Main Author:	Arnab K. Basu Nancy H. Chau Ravi Kanbur
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English
Zielgruppe:	Trade Academic
Place of publication:	Oxford, UK Blackwell Publishing 01.03.2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd WILEY-BLACKWELL PUBLISHING, INC Wiley Subscription Services, Inc
published in:	The Economic journal (London) Vol. 120; no. 543; pp. 244 - 269
Data of publication:	20100301
ISSN:	0013-0133 1468-0297
EISSN:	1468-0297
Discipline:	Economics
Bibliography:	and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and stimulating discussions. The usual disclaimer applies. Journal We thank Gary Fields, Mick Keen, Russ Krelove, Jonathan Thomas, seminar participants at Edinburgh, the IMF, and Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), members of the Cornell‐SEWA‐WIEGO Exposure and Dialogue Group, an Editor of this
Subjects:	Labor costs Minimum wage laws Labor supply Employment Labor markets Social welfare Compliance costs Minimum wage Wages Cost efficiency Economics Business & Economics Social Sciences Employers Labor law Laws, regulations and rules Analysis Compensation and benefits IMPACT MARKETS ECONOMICS
Online Access:	Fulltext
Database:	Social Sciences Citation Index Web of Knowledge Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index - 2010 Web of Science CrossRef Academic OneFile (A&I only) Database information Databases - DBIS