We present a theory of the choice of alternative democratic constitutions, a majoritarian or a consensual one, in an unequal society. We show that a consensual system turns out to be preferred by society when ex ante income inequality is relatively low, while a majoritarian system is chosen when inc...
|Place of publication:||
Oxford, UK Blackwell Publishing 01.03.2010
Blackwell Publishing Ltd
OXFORD UNIV PRESS
Wiley Subscription Services, Inc
|published in:||The Economic journal (London) Vol. 120; no. 543; pp. 1 - 39|
|Data of publication:||20100301|
Part of this article was written while Davide Ticchi was at University Pompeu Fabra whose hospitality is gratefully acknowledged. We thank two anonymous referees, Daron Acemoglu, Alberto Alesina, Roland Bénabou, Walter Garcia‐Fontes, José Garcia Montalvo, Gene Grossman, Arend Lijphart, Massimo Morelli, Elias Papaioannou, Torsten Persson, Gérard Roland, Stefano Sacchi, Gilles Saint‐Paul, Davide Sala, James Snyder, Guido Tabellini, Jonathan Temple, Ernesto Villanueva, Fabrizio Zilibotti and seminar participants at Princeton University, Brown University, MIT, Toulouse University, University of Turin, University of Ancona, IGIER‐Bocconi, Yale University, University of Modena, University of Urbino and The World Bank for useful comments. We are heavily indebted to Antonio Ciccone and Howard Rosenthal for long discussions, encouragements, and many valuable comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimers apply.
|Database:||Social Sciences Citation Index
Web of Knowledge
Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index - 2010
Web of Science
Academic OneFile (A&I only)
Database information Databases - DBIS