Competition in fragmentation among political coalitions: theory and evidence

This article proposes a game-theoretic setting to explain the fragmentation of majority and opposition coalitions in governments. The model is two-stage: (1) the leaders of each coalition control the size of the parties in their group so as to maximize the political power of their coalition, and (2)...

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Bibliographic details
Volume: 167
Main Author: Le Maux, Benoît
Rocaboy, Yvon
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Zielgruppe: Academic
Place of publication: New York Springer US 01.04.2016
SPRINGER
Springer
Springer Verlag
published in: Public choice Vol. 167; no. 1; pp. 67 - 94
ORCID: 0000-0002-8086-1745
0000-0002-8711-6123
Data of publication: 20160400
ISSN: 0048-5829
1573-7101
EISSN: 1573-7101
Discipline: Economics
Political Science
Subjects:
H72
C35
H40
D70
Online Access: Fulltext
Database: Social Sciences Citation Index
Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index - 2016
Web of Knowledge
Web of Science
CrossRef
Academic OneFile (A&I only)
Hyper Article en Ligne (HAL)
HAL-SHS: Archive ouverte en Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société
Database information Databases - DBIS