Competition in fragmentation among political coalitions: theory and evidence

This article proposes a game-theoretic setting to explain the fragmentation of majority and opposition coalitions in governments. The model is two-stage: (1) the leaders of each coalition control the size of the parties in their group so as to maximize the political power of their coalition, and (2)...

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Bibliographic details

Volume:	167
Main Author:	Le Maux, Benoît Rocaboy, Yvon
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English
Zielgruppe:	Academic
Place of publication:	New York Springer US 01.04.2016 SPRINGER Springer Springer Verlag
published in:	Public choice Vol. 167; no. 1; pp. 67 - 94
ORCID:	0000-0002-8086-1745 0000-0002-8711-6123
Data of publication:	20160400
ISSN:	0048-5829 1573-7101
EISSN:	1573-7101
Discipline:	Economics Political Science
Subjects:	Economics H72 C35 H40 Public Finance & Economics Political fragmentation Political coalitions Political competition D70 Political Science Business & Economics Social Sciences Government & Law Analysis Political parties Local government Economics and Finance Humanities and Social Sciences NUMBER PERFORMANCE ELECTORAL LAWS Political fragmentation Political coalitions MODEL CANDIDATES Political competition PARTIES political coalitions political fragmentation political competition
Online Access:	Fulltext
Database:	Social Sciences Citation Index Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index - 2016 Web of Knowledge Web of Science CrossRef Academic OneFile (A&I only) Hyper Article en Ligne (HAL) HAL-SHS: Archive ouverte en Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société Database information Databases - DBIS