An individualistic approach to institution formation in public good games

•In a public goods experiment, we investigate if individuals will unilaterally provide a sanctioning institution.•Only individuals who give themselves the ‘right’ to punish can do so.•Sanctioning need not be provided at group level; individuals can, and do, provide sanctioning in groups.•Sanctioning...

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Bibliographic details
Volume: 129
Main Author: Ramalingam, Abhijit
Godoy, Sara
Morales, Antonio J
Walker, James M
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Zielgruppe: Academic
Place of publication: AMSTERDAM Elsevier B.V 01.09.2016
ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
published in: Journal of economic behavior & organization Vol. 129; pp. 18 - 36
ORCID: 0000-0002-2843-8245
0000-0003-4301-4798
Data of publication: September 2016
ISSN: 0167-2681
1879-1751
EISSN: 1879-1751
Classification Codes:




Discipline: Business
Economics
Subjects:
H41
D02
C91
C92
C72
Online Access: available in Bonn?
Database: Web of Knowledge
Social Sciences Citation Index
Web of Science
Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index - 2016
CrossRef
Gale General OneFile (A&I only)
Academic OneFile (A&I only)
OpenAIRE (Open Access)
OpenAIRE
Database information Databases - DBIS