Genetic testing with primary prevention and moral hazard

•A genetic test reveals an individual's probability of developing a disease.•A costly prevention effort allows high-risk agents to decrease this probability.•Effort may or may not be observable by insurers.•Agents are not obliged to take the test, but must disclose its results to insurers.•We s...

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Bibliographic details

Volume:	32
Main Author:	Bardey, David De Donder, Philippe
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English
Zielgruppe:	Academic
Place of publication:	AMSTERDAM Elsevier B.V 01.09.2013 ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
published in:	Journal of health economics Vol. 32; no. 5; pp. 768 - 779
Data of publication:	September 2013
ISSN:	0167-6296 1879-1646
EISSN:	1879-1646
Discipline:	Public Health Economics
Subjects:	Personalized medicine Discrimination risk Informational value of test Economics Social Sciences Life Sciences & Biomedicine Health Care Sciences & Services Business & Economics Health Policy & Services Science & Technology Primary Prevention Genetic Testing Actuarial Analysis - statistics & numerical data Humans Insurance Coverage - ethics Insurance, Health - ethics Prejudice Morals Precision Medicine Genetic screening Health administration I18 Discrimination risk Personalized medicine D82 Informational value of test HEALTH-INSURANCE INFORMATION MARKETS ADVERSE SELECTION SELF-PROTECTION
Online Access:	available in Bonn?
Database:	Social Sciences Citation Index Web of Science - Science Citation Index Expanded - 2013 Web of Knowledge Science Citation Index Expanded Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index - 2013 Web of Science MEDLINE (Ovid) PubMed MEDLINE MEDLINE MEDLINE Medline CrossRef Academic OneFile (A&I only) MEDLINE - Academic Database information Databases - DBIS