A Theory of Optimal Random Crackdowns

An incentives based theory of policing is developed which can explain the phenomenon of random "crackdowns," i.e., intermittent periods of high interdiction/surveillance. For a variety of police objective functions, random crackdowns can be part of the optimal monitoring strategy. We demon...

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Bibliographic details
Volume: 100
Main Author: Jan Eeckhout
Nicola Persico
Petra E. Todd
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Zielgruppe: Academic
Place of publication: NASHVILLE American Economic Association 01.06.2010
AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC
published in: The American economic review Vol. 100; no. 3; pp. 1104 - 1135
ORCID: 0000-0001-6509-4296
Data of publication: 20100601
ISSN: 0002-8282
1944-7981
EISSN: 1944-7981
Discipline: Economics
Law
Subjects:
LAW
Online Access: Fulltext
Database: Social Sciences Citation Index
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Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index - 2010
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