Optimal unemployment insurance for older workers

This paper studies the optimal unemployment insurance for older workers in a repeated principal–agent model, where the search intensity of risk-averse workers (the agents) is not observed by the risk-neutral insurance agency (the principal). When unemployment benefits are the only available tool, th...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic details
Volume: 96
Main Author: Hairault, Jean-Olivier
Langot, François
Ménard, Sébastien
Sopraseuth, Thepthida
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Zielgruppe: Trade
Academic
Place of publication: LAUSANNE Elsevier B.V 01.06.2012
ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
Elsevier
published in: Journal of public economics Vol. 96; no. 5-6; pp. 509 - 519
ORCID: 0000-0002-7458-0365
0000-0003-4951-8364
Data of publication: June 2012
ISSN: 0047-2727
1879-2316
EISSN: 1879-2316
Discipline: Economics
Mathematics
Political Science
Subjects:
J65
J64
C61
AGE
Online Access: available in Bonn?
Database: Social Sciences Citation Index
Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index - 2012
Web of Knowledge
Web of Science
CrossRef
Academic OneFile (A&I only)
Hyper Article en Ligne (HAL) (Open Access)
Hyper Article en Ligne (HAL)
HAL-SHS: Archive ouverte en Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société
OpenAIRE
OpenAIRE (Open Access)
Database information Databases - DBIS