Job Assignments under Moral Hazard: The Peter Principle Revisited

We show that inefficient job assignments arise in organizations even if there is full information about employees’ types and complete contracts are possible. Our model also provides a new perspective on the Peter Principle: the output of an employee who is promoted into a job for which he is not wel...

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Bibliographic details
Volume: 21
Main Author: Koch, Alexander K
Nafziger, Julia
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Zielgruppe: Academic
Place of publication: Malden, USA Blackwell Publishing Inc Winter 2012
Wiley Subscription Services, Inc
published in: Journal of economics & management strategy Vol. 21; no. 4; pp. 1029 - 1059
ORCID: 0000-0001-9471-1636
Data of publication: Winter 2012
ISSN: 1058-6407
EISSN: 1530-9134
Discipline: Economics
Bibliography: We thank Mathias Dewatripont, Guido Friebel, Paul Heidhues, Ian Jewitt, Thomas Kittsteiner, Matthias Kräkel, Johan Lagerlöf, Meg Meyer, David Myatt, Urs Schweizer, John Sutton and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. Nafziger is grateful to Nuffield College, University of Oxford for its kind hospitality.
Online Access: Fulltext
Database: Social Sciences Citation Index
Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index - 2012
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