Job Assignments under Moral Hazard: The Peter Principle Revisited
We show that inefficient job assignments arise in organizations even if there is full information about employees’ types and complete contracts are possible. Our model also provides a new perspective on the Peter Principle: the output of an employee who is promoted into a job for which he is not wel...
Koch, Alexander K
|Place of publication:||
Malden, USA Blackwell Publishing Inc Winter 2012
Wiley Subscription Services, Inc
|published in:||Journal of economics & management strategy Vol. 21; no. 4; pp. 1029 - 1059|
|Data of publication:||Winter 2012|
We thank Mathias Dewatripont, Guido Friebel, Paul Heidhues, Ian Jewitt, Thomas Kittsteiner, Matthias Kräkel, Johan Lagerlöf, Meg Meyer, David Myatt, Urs Schweizer, John Sutton and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. Nafziger is grateful to Nuffield College, University of Oxford for its kind hospitality.
|Database:||Social Sciences Citation Index
Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index - 2012
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