Information feedback and contest structure in rent-seeking games

We investigate the effects of information feedback in rent-seeking games with two different contest structures. In the share contest a contestant receives a share of the rent equal to her share of rent-seeking expenditures, while in the lottery contest a contestant wins the entire rent with probabil...

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Bibliographic details
Volume: 64
Main Author: Fallucchi, Francesco
Renner, Elke
Sefton, Martin
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Place of publication: Elsevier B.V 01.11.2013
published in: European economic review Vol. 64; pp. 223 - 240
Data of publication: November 2013
ISSN: 0014-2921
1873-572X
EISSN: 1873-572X
Discipline: Economics
Subjects:
C92
D72
C72
Online Access: Fulltext
Database: ScienceDirect Open Access Titles
Elsevier:ScienceDirect:Open Access
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