Shadow Banking and Bank Capital Regulation

Banks are subject to capital requirements because their privately optimal leverage is higher than the socially optimal one. This is in turn because banks fail to internalize all costs that their insolvency creates for agents who use their money-like liabilities to settle transactions. If banks can b...

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Bibliographic details
Volume: 28
Main Author: Plantin, Guillaume
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Place of publication: CARY Oxford University Press 01.01.2015
OXFORD UNIV PRESS INC
published in: The Review of financial studies Vol. 28; no. 1; pp. 146 - 175
Data of publication: 20150101
ISSN: 0893-9454
1465-7368
EISSN: 1465-7368
Discipline: Business
Economics
Subjects:
Online Access: Fulltext
Database: Web of Knowledge
Social Sciences Citation Index
Web of Science
Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index - 2015
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Database information Databases - DBIS