OPTIMAL IMMIGRATION POLICY: WHEN THE PUBLIC GOOD IS RIVAL

In this model, we characterize optimal immigration and fiscal policies in the presence of a rival public good and heterogeneous discounting. Surprisingly, even if the government is benevolent towards natives only, it is optimal to keep borders open. Indeed, in the long run, patient natives hold the...

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Bibliographic details
Volume: 62
Main Author: BOSI, STEFANO
ILIOPULOS, ELENI
JAYET, HUBERT
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Zielgruppe: Academic
Place of publication: Melbourne, Australia Blackwell Publishing Asia 01.12.2011
SPRINGER HEIDELBERG
Japanese Economic Association
Wiley Subscription Services, Inc
Wiley
published in: Japanese economic review (Oxford, England) Vol. 62; no. 4; pp. 460 - 484
ORCID: 0000-0001-6707-5638
Data of publication: December 2011
ISSN: 1352-4739
1468-5876
EISSN: 1468-5876
Discipline: Economics
Bibliography: We would like to thank two anonymous referees for their constructive criticism. We acknowledge Cuong Le Van, Thomas Seegmuller, Bertrand Wigniolle and the other participants of the Group in Economic Dynamics seminar in Paris, and also Guido Cazzavillan, Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira, Frédéric Dufourt and Francesco Magris for helpful comments. All errors are our own.
Series: The Japanese Economic Review
Subjects:
H41
J61
E32
D91
Online Access: available in Bonn?
Database: Social Sciences Citation Index
Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index - 2011
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