OPTIMAL IMMIGRATION POLICY: WHEN THE PUBLIC GOOD IS RIVAL
In this model, we characterize optimal immigration and fiscal policies in the presence of a rival public good and heterogeneous discounting. Surprisingly, even if the government is benevolent towards natives only, it is optimal to keep borders open. Indeed, in the long run, patient natives hold the...
Saved in:
Volume: | 62 |
---|---|
Main Author: |
BOSI, STEFANO
ILIOPULOS, ELENI JAYET, HUBERT |
Format: | Journal Article |
Language: | English |
Zielgruppe: |
Academic |
Place of publication: |
Melbourne, Australia Blackwell Publishing Asia 01.12.2011 SPRINGER HEIDELBERG Japanese Economic Association Wiley Subscription Services, Inc Wiley |
published in: | Japanese economic review (Oxford, England) Vol. 62; no. 4; pp. 460 - 484 |
ORCID: |
0000-0001-6707-5638 |
Data of publication: | December 2011 |
ISSN: |
1352-4739 1468-5876 |
EISSN: |
1468-5876 |
Discipline: | Economics |
Bibliography: |
We would like to thank two anonymous referees for their constructive criticism. We acknowledge Cuong Le Van, Thomas Seegmuller, Bertrand Wigniolle and the other participants of the Group in Economic Dynamics seminar in Paris, and also Guido Cazzavillan, Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira, Frédéric Dufourt and Francesco Magris for helpful comments. All errors are our own. |
Series: |
The Japanese Economic Review |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | available in Bonn? |
Database: | Social Sciences Citation Index Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index - 2011 Web of Knowledge Web of Science RePEc RePEc IDEAS Academic OneFile (A&I only) Hyper Article en Ligne (HAL) HAL-SHS: Archive ouverte en Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société OpenAIRE OpenAIRE (Open Access) Database information Databases - DBIS |