DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS IN HOUSEHOLD MODELS: SEPARATE SPHERES AND INCOME POOLING
We derive distributional effects for a non-cooperative alternative to the unitary model of household behaviour. We consider the Nash equilibria of a voluntary contributions to public goods game. Our main result is that, in general, the two partners either choose to contribute to different public goo...
|Place of publication:||
Oxford, UK Blackwell Publishing 01.06.2010
Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Wiley Subscription Services, Inc
|published in:||The Economic journal (London) Vol. 120; no. 545; pp. 786 - 799|
|Data of publication:||20100601|
Some of the results in this article appeared in an earlier paper entitled ‘Caring and sharing’ which should now be considered superseded. Browning thanks the Danish National Research Foundation for support through its grant to CAM. Lechene acknowledges funding under ESRC Research Fellowship RES‐063‐27‐0002. We thank Ian Preston and two referees for comments.
|Database:||Social Sciences Citation Index
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