Belief elicitation in experiments: is there a hedging problem?

Belief-elicitation experiments usually reward accuracy of stated beliefs in addition to payments for other decisions. But this allows risk-averse subjects to hedge with their stated beliefs against adverse outcomes of the other decisions. So can we trust the existing belief-elicitation results? And...

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Bibliographic details

Volume:	13
Main Author:	Blanco, Mariana Engelmann, Dirk Koch, Alexander K Normann, Hans-Theo
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English
Zielgruppe:	Academic
Place of publication:	Boston Springer US 01.12.2010 SPRINGER Springer
published in:	Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic Science Association Vol. 13; no. 4; pp. 412 - 438
ORCID:	0000-0002-0242-5948 0000-0001-9471-1636 0000-0002-2458-1327
Data of publication:	20101200
ISSN:	1386-4157 1573-6938
EISSN:	1573-6938
Discipline:	Economics
Series:	Experimental Economics
Subjects:	Experimental economics Operations Research/Decision Theory Belief elicitation Microeconomics Public Finance & Economics Economic Theory Hedging C90 Experimental methodology Methodology and the History of Economic Thought Economics / Management Science C72 Economics Business & Economics Social Sciences Belief elicitation; Hedging; Experimental economics; Experimental methodology; C72; C90 Analysis Hedging (Finance) Experimental economics PERSONAL PROBABILITIES SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITIES Hedging RISK STATED BELIEFS GAME THEORIST Belief elicitation PREFERENCES EQUILIBRIUM AMBIGUITY Experimental methodology EXPECTATIONS PRISONERS-DILEMMA
Online Access:	Fulltext
Database:	Social Sciences Citation Index Web of Knowledge Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index - 2010 Web of Science RePEc RePEc IDEAS CrossRef Academic OneFile (A&I only) Database information Databases - DBIS