Investment without democracy: Ruling-party institutionalization and credible commitment in autocracies
► Institutionalized ruling parties discourage expropriatory behavior in autocracies. ► Autocracies with such parties can attract high levels of private investment. ► Institutionalization of the Chinese Communist Party encouraged private investment. What explains private investment in autocracies, wh...
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Volume: | 39 |
---|---|
Main Author: |
Gehlbach, Scott
Keefer, Philip |
Format: | Journal Article |
Language: | English |
Zielgruppe: |
Academic |
Place of publication: |
SAN DIEGO Elsevier Inc 2011 ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE Elsevier Elsevier B.V |
published in: | Journal of Comparative Economics Vol. 39; no. 2; pp. 123 - 139 |
Data of publication: | 2011 |
ISSN: |
0147-5967 1095-7227 |
EISSN: |
1095-7227 |
Discipline: | Economics |
Bibliography: |
China http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo |
Series: |
Journal of Comparative Economics |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | available in Bonn? |
Database: | Open Knowledge Repository Social Sciences Citation Index Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index - 2011 Web of Knowledge Web of Science RePEc RePEc IDEAS CrossRef Gale General OneFile (A&I only) Academic OneFile (A&I only) Database information Databases - DBIS |