Selection on Moral Hazard in Health Insurance

We use employee-level panel data from a single firm to explore the possibility that individuals may select insurance coverage in part based on their anticipated behavioral ("moral hazard") response to insurance, a phenomenon we label "selection on moral hazard." Using a model of...

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Bibliographic details
Volume: 103
Main Author: Liran Einav
Amy Finkelstein
Stephen P. Ryan
Paul Schrimpf
Mark R. Cullen
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Zielgruppe: Academic
Place of publication: NASHVILLE American Economic Association 01.02.2013
AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC
published in: The American economic review Vol. 103; no. 1; pp. 178 - 219
Data of publication: 20130201
ISSN: 0002-8282
1944-7981
EISSN: 1944-7981
Discipline: Economics
Law
Subjects:
Online Access: Fulltext
Database: Social Sciences Citation Index
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Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index - 2013
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