Incentives for Partial Acquisitions and Real Market Concentration

We analyze the incentives for a controlling shareholder to acquire silent or controlling shares in a competitor. When it occurs, the acquisition is detrimental to minority shareholders of his firm, or to the target, or even to both. The ownership structure of firms turns out to be a key variable. Th...

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Bibliographic details
Volume: 165
Main Author: Charlety, Patricia
Fagart, Marie-Cecile
Souam, Said
Format: Journal Article
Language: German, English
Zielgruppe: Academic
Place of publication: TUBINGEN Mohr Siebeck 01.09.2009
J C B MOHR
Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen
Verlag J.C.B. Mohr (Germany)
published in: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics Vol. 165; no. 3; pp. 508 - 534
Data of publication: September 2009
ISSN: 0932-4569
1614-0559
EISSN: 1614-0559
Discipline: Social Sciences (General)
Economics
Series: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE)
Subjects:
Online Access: Fulltext
Database: Web of Knowledge
Social Sciences Citation Index
Web of Science
Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index - 2009
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