Sorting versus screening: Search frictions and competing mechanisms

In a market where sellers compete by posting trading mechanisms, we allow for a general search technology and show that its features crucially affect the equilibrium mechanism. Price posting prevails when meetings are rival, i.e., when a meeting by one buyer reduces another buyer's meeting prob...

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Bibliographic details
Volume: 145
Main Author: Eeckhout, Jan
Kircher, Philipp
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Zielgruppe: Academic
Place of publication: SAN DIEGO Elsevier Inc 01.07.2010
ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
Elsevier
Elsevier B.V
published in: Journal of economic theory Vol. 145; no. 4; pp. 1354 - 1385
ORCID: 0000-0001-6509-4296
Data of publication: July 2010
ISSN: 0022-0531
1095-7235
EISSN: 1095-7235
Classification Codes:


Discipline: Economics
Series: Journal of Economic Theory
Subjects:
C78
D44
D83
Online Access: available in Bonn?
Database: Social Sciences Citation Index
Web of Knowledge
Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index - 2010
Web of Science
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RePEc IDEAS
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