Development and the interaction of enforcement institutions

We examine how formal and informal contract enforcing institutions interact in a competitive market with asymmetric information where consumers do not observe quality before purchase. Firm level incentives for producing high quality can be achieved with an informal enforcement mechanism, reputation,...

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Bibliographic details
Volume: 95
Main Author: Dhillon, Amrita
Rigolini, Jamele
Format: Journal Article
Language: English
Zielgruppe: Trade
Academic
Place of publication: LAUSANNE Elsevier B.V 2011
ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
Elsevier
published in: Journal of public economics Vol. 95; no. 1; pp. 79 - 87
Data of publication: 2011
ISSN: 0047-2727
1879-2316
EISSN: 1879-2316
Discipline: Economics
Mathematics
Political Science
Bibliography: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo
Series: Journal of Public Economics
Subjects:
O12
D8
L1
D02
Online Access: available in Bonn?
Database: Open Knowledge Repository
Web of Knowledge
Social Sciences Citation Index
Web of Science
Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index - 2011
RePEc IDEAS
RePEc
CrossRef
Academic OneFile (A&I only)
Database information Databases - DBIS